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INTRODUCTION TO DISCRIMINATION
Meet Ruth. She is a twenty-three year-old graduate of a university in
Bonn, Germany. She just obtained her degree in civil engineering and is
returning to her hometown in Bremen, Germany, to look for a job. She
hopes to get a position with the city and to excel in her field. Yet inter-
views have proved fruitless for Ruth. While she shares the same qualifica-
tions as others her age, she is being passed over for her male colleagues.
Even more astonishing is the fact that Ruth has no legal remedy.
Although Ruth is a fictional character, her story is typical of many
women's experiences in the European job market. Ruth represents women
who have been and will be denied career opportunities due to gender dis-
crimination. During the past century, the introduction of women into the
labor market has forced legislatures to implement and employers to adjust
to laws regarding gender equality and positive action. While such laws
have changed the dynamics of the employer-employee relationship, they
have failed to provide women with unconditional equality in the workplace.
During the past few decades, gender equality has arisen as a topic of
concern in the United States and abroad.' Recently, legislatures worldwide
recognized and addressed gender equality by passing laws prohibiting dis-
2crimination. The European Community encouraged such laws in Member
. Juris Doctorate Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 1998. I would like
to thank Professor Martha Fineman, Columbia University, Professor Laura Lin, Northwest-
ern University, Ray Sinnapan, Allison Wing-Takahashi, Brad Aaron, Patrick Shaw, and Mi-
chelle Ochs for their comments. I would also like to thank Darlene Donahue, Paul Donahue,
and William Donahue for their support.
1 See Josephine Shaw, Recent Developments in the Field of Labour Market Equality: Sex
Discrimination Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 13 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 18 (199 1).
2Jill Andrews, National and International Sources of Women's Right to Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities: Equality in Law Versus Equality in Fact, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
413, 413 n.2 (1994).
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States,3 and many Members complied by passing equal opportunity laws.4
This note examines one such law.
The state of Bremen in Germany created a positive action law for
women in under-represented areas of the state employment market.5 The
law provides for the promotion of equally qualified women when under-
represented in an area of employment. Yet, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) determined that the law exceeded the bounds of the Council Directive
76/207, Article 2(4), and thus was inconsistent with the anti-discrimination
laws of the European Union.6 The issue addressed by the Court and this
note involves balancing non-discrimination against positive action. Spe-
cifically, the question addressed here is whether a law which promotes a
person of one gender over a person of another gender when all other quali-
fications are equal constitutes unlawful discrimination.
3See Council Recommendations 84/635, 1984 O.J. (L331) 34, which suggests Member
States "adopt a positive action policy designed to eliminate existing inequalities affecting
women.. .eliminate or counteract the prejudicial effects on women in employment.. .from
existing attitudes... encourage the participation of women in.. .occupations... where they are
at present under-represented."; see also Andrews, supra note 2, at 414.
4 Andrews, supra note 2, at 414.
5 Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3069, 1-3072,
[1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 175, 191 (1995) [hereinafter Kalanke].6Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3078, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 194.7 Before delving into the decision and the reasoning behind the ruling, an explanation of
the European Union is required. In 1957, negotiations among France, West Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg resulted in the Treaty of Rome. Andrews, supra
note 2. See also Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. I I [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The Treaty of Rome established the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Rebecca Means, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen: The
Significance of the Kalanke Decision on Future Positive Action Programs in the European
Union, 30 VAND.J.TRANSNAT'L L. 1087, 1091 (1997). In signing this Treaty, these countries
established a free trade area. Id. Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom joined in 1973.
Id. Greece became a member in 1979, with Spain and Portugal following suit in 1986. Id.
Recently, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined thereby brining membership in the European
Union to 15 members. Regine Wosnitza, Court Ruling Casts Doubt on Fate of Europe's Af-
firnative Action Programs, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Dec. 9, 1995, at 42A and Means, su-
pra, at 1093.
In 1992, an amendment to the Treaty of Rome was signed resulting in a document more
widely known as the Maastricht Treaty. Means, at 1093, and The Treaty on the European
Union, August 31, 1992, 35 O.J. (C 224) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. Besides renaming
the European Economic Community the European Union, the Treaty set up timelines for the
creation of a common currency. Id., at 5, Art. B, and Means, supra, at 1093. The Treaty did
not overrule or supercede the Treaty of Rome, but acted to supplement the provisions.
Maastricht Treaty, at 5, Art. A., and Means, supra, at 1094.
The Treaty of Rome established four institutions: the Commission, the Council of Min-
isters, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Andrews, supra
note 2, at 421. Each institution performs a specific task in running the European Commu-
nity. The Commission proposes and enforces legislation. Id. The Council of Ministers
"composed of members from the.. .E[uropean] C[ommunity] States," implements EC law.
Id. at 421-22. The European Parliament "reviews proposed legislation and acts as a public
forum, " and the ECJ "is the EC Supreme Court," Id. at 422, made up of fifteen members,
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Part I of this note describes the facts that lead up to the ruling in Ka-
lanke v. Freie Hansesetadt Bremen and critiques the decision of the ECJ.
Since the Court's reasoning lacks depth and precedence, Part II examines
the opinion of the Advocate General to explain the possible reasoning be-
hind the decision. Part III scrutinizes the degree of cohesiveness between
the Kalanke ruling and subsequent decisions by the ECJ. Part IV follows
the reactions of the European market to Kalanke. Part V examines propos-
als to minimize the effects of the decision. Finally, the note proposes
statutory language designed to remedy the situation created by Kalanke.'
one from each state. Fred Barbash, Little-Known Court Voids Laws of Europe's Nations;
Two Recent Rulings Bar Favoring Women, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at A25. The ECJ
differs from American Supreme Courts in that its rulings are not binding. Yet, the practical
effects are that the decisions are usually followed by Member States as correct interpreta-
tions of EU law. See Means, supra, at 1108. Any amendments to the Treaty "require
unanimous support from all 15 European Union members." Wosnitza, supra.
The Treaty of Rome, with its amendments, constitutes the body of law for what is now
the European Union, which consists of 15 European nations. (The Treaty has been amended
twice. Once in 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty and once in 1997, with the Treaty of Am-
sterdam. The four institutions survived the amendments.) The Member States are responsi-
ble for adopting laws consistent with the treaties of the European Union. The European
Parliament reviews the proposed legislation and provides a public forum. The Council of
Ministers votes on and sometimes carries out the laws. Under a principle known as subsidi-
arity, the Member States implement the new laws when possible. If a Member State is un-
able to implement the law for any reason, the Council will become involved in implementing
the law. When a change needs to be made or a law needs to be added, the Commission pro-
poses the legislation.Then all of the Member States must agree to the proposal before it can
be added to the Treaty. Once it is added, the Council of Ministers implements the law and
the Commission enforces the law. Any questions regarding the Treaty or regarding whether
a Member State's law is in conflict with the Treaty or its Directives are reviewed and de-
cided upon by the ECJ.
8This paper makes several presumptions of which the reader should be aware. In gen-
eral, the author supports positive/affirmative action. More specifically, the author first pre-
sumes equality in the workplace between men and women, both actual and numerical, is a
worthwhile goal. Second, the author presumes that, in general, when a qualified woman is
passed over for a job, the passing is likely to be an act of prejudice or discrimination. (Why
else would the man get the job, all things being equal?) Third, the author presumes that
positive action helps promote equality in the workplace and combats discrimination.
Scholars share the presumptions of the author. A professor of economics at the Univer-
sity of Illinois wrote in a book review,
Disparities in earnings and occupations by race and sex have long been documented and
are not in dispute. Nor does anyone question that discrimination did at one time play a
part in causing these disparities, for there is no denying that long after slavery was
abolished, minorities faced legally sanctioned barriers against equal access to education
and training, and long after women attained the right to vote, they too were excluded by
schools and labor unions, and married women were even precluded from holding cer-
tain types of jobs.
Marianne A. Ferber, In Defense of Affirmative Action, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 516, n.3
(Apr. 1997) (reviewing BARBARA R. BERGMAN, IN THE DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(1996)).
Furthermore, a United Nations report stated, "discriminatory practices are based on em-
bedded social mechanisms or explicit public policies on the gender division of labour, politi-
cal contests, education, households and access to credit." .. . But Severe Poverty Afflicts a
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I. THE KALNKE RULING
On October 17, 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled that a posi-
tive action law, which provided for the promotion of equally qualified
women when under-represented in an area of employment,9 violated the
laws prohibiting gender discrimination in the European Union. 10 The suit
began with two individuals, Heike Glissman" and Eckhard Kalanke 1 2 Ms.
Glissman began working as a horticultural employee for the Parks Depart-
ment of Bremen in 1975.13 In 1983, Ms. Glissman obtained her diploma in
landscape gardening.1 4 While Ms. Glissman was hired two years after Eck-
hard Kalanke, they were both in the same pay bracket. 5
Mr. Kalanke was hired in 1973 and acted as the assistant to the Section
Manager.1 6 He also held a diploma in horticulture and landscape garden-
ing. 7 After years of work, the position for Section Manager became avail-
able. Both Ms. Glissman and Mr. Kalanke applied for the position. The
Quarter of the World; 1997 Report on the World Social Situation, 34 UN CHRON. 33, n.1
(Mar. 22, 1997).
9 The Law on Equal Treatment of Men and Women in the Public Service of the Land of
Bremen provides in part:
(1) In the case of an appointment (including establishment as a civil servant or judge)
which is not made for training purposes, women who have the same qualifications as
men applying for the same post are to be given priority in sectors where they are under-
represented.
(2) In the case of an assignment to a position in a higher pay, remuneration and salary
bracket, women who have the same qualifications as men applying for the same post
are to be given priority if they are under-represented. This also applies in the case of
assignment to a different official post and promotion.
(3)...
(4) Qualifications are to be evaluated exclusively in accordance with the requirements
ofthe occupation, post to be filled or career bracket. Specific experience and capabili-
ties, such as those acquired as a result of family, work, social commitment or unpaid
activity, are part of qualifications within the meaning of subparagraphs (1) and (2) if
they are of use in performing the duties of the position in question.
(5) There is under-representation if women do not make up at least half of the staff in
the individual pay, remuneration and salary brackets in the relevant personnel group
within a department. This also applies to the function levels provided for in the organi-
zation chart.
Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Opinion of the Advocate General, 1995 E.C.R_ I-
3053, 1-3054-55, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 177, 178-79 [hereinafter Kalanke AG].
'0 Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3078, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 194.
"Business and the Law: Decision on Sex Discrimination-European Court, FIN. T)IES,
Nov. 7, 1995, at 30 [hereinafter Business and the Law]; see also Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at I-
3073, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 191.
12European Court Rejects Using Quotas to Hire and Promote Women, L.A. Timm,
Home Edition, Oct. 18, 1995, at A16 [hereinafter EC,. Rejects Quotas]; see also Kalanke,
1995 E.C.R. at 1-3073, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 191.
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Parks Department promoted Ms. Glissman to the position of Section Man-
ager.19
Mr. Kalanke challenged the decision to promote Ms. Glissman in arbi-
tration.20 The arbitration "resulted in a recommendation in favor" of the
promotion of Mr. Kalanke.2' The staff of the department, however, claimed
that the arbitration had failed and "appealed to the Conciliation Board. 22
The decision of the Conciliation Board found, despite the differences in
seniority, that the two candidates were equally qualified; thus, priority went
to Ms. Glissman under the Landesgleichstellungsgesetz (Bremen Law on
Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Public Service) ("Bremen law").
23
Mr. Kalanke appealed to the Labor Court that his qualifications sur-24
passed those of Ms. Glissman. Both the Labor Court and the Regional
Labor Court dismissed Mr. Kalanke's claims.
Mr. Kalanke continued to appeal the promotion. The German Federal
Labor Court found that the Conciliation Board correctly applied the Bremen
law on equal treatment and correctly promoted Ms. Glissman.26 The Court
said that the system in Bremen did not consist of strict quotas, but of quotas
dependent on the abilities of the candidates.27 Women enjoyed "no priority
unless the candidates of both sexes" were equally qualified." 8 Furthermore,
the court found that if priority was "given in principle to women," appropri-
ate cases resulted in exceptions.2 9 The exceptions permitted under the
Bremen law were important because they allowed men to be promoted over
equally-qualified women in underrepresented professions. Thus, a system
of strict quotas did not exist. Yet, because the Federal Labor Court sought
to apply Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 EEC to the Bremen law, the court
stayed the proceeding for a ECJ ruling on the scope of Article 2(4).30
The European Court of Justice disagreed with the opinion of the Fed-
eral Labor Court that the Bremen law allowed for exceptions in appropriate
cases.31 In a terse opinion,32 the ECJ said that a national rule that "auto-






23Id. The Conciliation Board is the first step in the process after arbitration fails. The
decision of the Conciliation Board is binding on the employer. Id.
24Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3073, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 191-92.







3 0Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3075-76, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 192-93. See Equal Opportu-
nities, infra note 36, and Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40, for a full view of the
text of Article 2(4).
31See Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3077, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 193.
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The opinion of the ECJ began with the question of the scope of Article
2, sections 1 and 4 of the Directive. 4 Section 1 outlaws discrimination on
the basis of sex, "either directly or indirectly."35 Section 4 "provides that
the Directive 'shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal op-
portunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequali-
ties which affect women's opportunities.' ' 36 The German Federal Labor
Court asked the ECJ to consider the Bremen law under the scope of Article
2, section 4.37 The ECJ found that national rules guaranteeing women "ab-
solute and unconditional priority" go beyond "promoting equal opportuni-
ties" and overstep the boundaries of Article 2(4).38 The ECJ interpreted
Article 2(4) strictly, stating that a Member cannot substitute the result of
equality for equality of opportunity.39
While the ECJ prohibited the Bremen law under the Directive, the
Court acknowledged that one means of combating prejudice against women40
entails promoting women to senior posts within the workplace. The ECJ
also recognized figures that show women constitute a low percentage in
high career brackets.4 ' These findings could be the reason for the narrow
ruling of the court - only outlawing those laws giving "automatic" priority
to women.42
Yet, the ruling by the Court, in relying on the automatic nature of the
Bremen law,43 only alluded to substituting the result of equality for equality
of opportunity as a possible reason for finding the Bremen law outside the
scope of the exception found in Article 2(4). While Peter Duffy, a legal
commentator for the Solicitor's Journal, asserted that the decision of the
ECJ "flows logically from the wording, structure and object of the Equal
Treatment Directive,"44 the ECJ's decision lacks the reasoning crucial for
other courts to be able to apply the ruling. The ECJ outlawed absolute and
32Sarah Moore, Nothing Positive from the Court of Justice, 21 EuR. L. REv. 156, 158
(1996).
33Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R at 1-3077, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 193.
34Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3075-77, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 192-93.35Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3076, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 193.36Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3077, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 193. Article 2(4) states: "This
Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for men and
women in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities
in the areas referred to in Article 1, (1)." Council Directive 76/207, supra note 30, and
Equal Opportunities: Commission Defines Scope of Positive Action, EuR. INTELLIGENCE,
Apr. 16, 1996, §114 [hereinafter Equal Opportunities].
37See Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3075-76, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 192-93.
38See Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3078, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 194.
39Id.
4°See Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3076, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 193.41 See id.
42See Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3079, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 195.
43See id.
44Peter Duffy, European Briefing, 139 SOLIC. J. 1095 (1995).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:730 (1998)
unconditional priority as exceeding Article 2(4) in the Directive. The ECJ
further stated that the Bremen system incorrectly substituted the result of
equality of opportunity instead of providing equal opportunity, but left un-
answered the question of the scope of its ruling and how it should be ap-
plied in future cases.
Sarah Moore, a barrister and a legal secretary at the Court of First In-
stance, pointed to many arguments that could be made to reach the opposite
result. She examined the argument that the Bremen law was not absolute
and unconditional; the argument that Article 2(4) helped create the general
framework of the Article - not an exception - thus giving rise to a looser
standard of interpretation than strict interpretation; and the argument that
quota systems constitute one way to reach the objectives of Article 2(4).45
Ms. Moore found the decision "tenable," if confusing." Moore's conclusion
lacks foundation in the same way that Duffy's opinion that the ruling
"flows logically" from the Article4 7 lacks merit.
"Absolute priority" fails as a basis on which to overrule the Bremen
law on equal treatment. The law as established gave women priority when
under-represented in a certain grade of employment.48 The dictionary de-
fines priority as "precedence, especially established by order of importance
or urgency. An established right to precedence. ' 49 The definition of prece-
dence is "the act, state, or right of preceding" or coming before in time, or-
der or rank.50 Based on these definitions, being given priority means being
given the right to come before another in order or rank. It does not mean
the automatic promotion of an individual. The ECJ went too far in using
the term "unconditional priority," because priority is a term of ranking.
Priority is in no way an absolute term, much as Ms. Moore pointed out in
her article.5 l Barbara R. Bergmann, an author of a book on affirmative ac-
tion, drew a distinction between quotas and goals: "Goals are intended to
reduce rather than to perpetuate privilege, to open up jobs previously re-
served for white men to others, but only to the extent that they have the
necessary qualifications. ' 2 Thus, the distinction this author draws between
quotas and goals lies within a requirement of necessary qualifications. If
qualifications are necessary, no quota system exists. Furthermore, the
German Federal Court said that allowances were made for individual cir-
cumstances in cases regarding equally qualified candidates separated by
sex.53 Thus, the ECJ interpreted the Bremen law incorrectly in asserting
4 5See Moore, supra note 32, at 158-60.
461d. at 161.
47Duffy, supra note 44, at 1095.41Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3072-73, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 191.
49
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 985 (2d ed. 1982).
501d. at 974.
51See Moore, supra note 32, at 159.
52Ferber, supra note 8.
53See Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3074, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 192.
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that the law gave automatic priority to women in such a way that the law
over-stepped the boundaries of Article 2 (4).
I. MR. TESAURO'S OPINION: POSSIBLE RATIONALE BEHIND THE DECISION
The Advocate General, Mr. Tesauro, wrote an opinion to the ECJ re-
garding Kalanke,5 4 and the Court appeared to adopt at least the conclusion
of Tesauro's opinion. The Tesauro opinion may serve to illuminate the be-
hind-the-scenes reasoning of the Court. Mr. Tesauro started by examining
parts of the Directive, identifying an inherent tension between, on the one
hand, Article 1(1), which establishes the principle of equal treatment-in em-
ployment, and Article 2(1), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
gender, and, on the other hand, Article 2(4) which allows "the Member
States to adopt" and/or maintain "measures to promote equal" treatment "by
removing existing inequalities. 5  In Council Recommendation
84/635/EEC of December 13, 1984, the Council interpreted Article 2(4) as
a "promotion of positive action for women" to counteract "the prejudicial
effects on women" arising "from social attitudes, behavior and structures. 5 6
Examination of the Bremen law revealed that the law allowed priority for
equally-qualified but under-represented women. 7 As used in the Bremen
law on equal treatment, under-represented denotes a situation in which the
percentage of women is less than half of "the individual pay, remuneration
and salary brackets. 58 The Advocate General posed the issue as: "Must
each individual's right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of
sex" - which the court held is "a fundamental right"-- yield "to the rights
of the disadvantaged group," in order "to compensate for the discrimination
suffered by that group in the past?
' 59
Mr. Tesauro attempted to answer this question by discussing how
positive action developed to eliminate existing obstacles affecting disad-
54Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3053, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 177. The Advocate General
serves as an advisor to the ECJ and issues opinions on legal questions before the court. The
opinion is not binding but is often used as a secondary source or as a source of reasoning.
551d.
S6Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R at 1-3054, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 177-78. Recommendation
84/635 states that "existing legal provisions on equal treatment, which are designed to afford
rights to individuals, are inadequate for the elimination of all existing inequalities unless par-
allel action is taken by governments, both sides of industry and other bodies concerned, to
counteract the prejudicial effects on women in employment which arise from social attitudes,
behavior and structures." Council Recommendation 84/635, 1984 O.J. (L 331) 34, or supra
note 3, and Court Rules Against Discrimination in Favour of Women, MONTHLY REP. ON
EUR., Oct. 27, 1995, § 133 [hereinafter MONTHLY REP.]
A recommendation is a statement issued by the Council of Ministers. The Council is re-
sponsible for implementing EU laws. Thus, a Council recommendation defines the scope of
the law according to the Council and how they intend to fulfill the law.57See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3054-55, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 178-79.
58Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3055, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 179.
-"Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3057, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 180-81.
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vantaged groups. 60 In Tesauro's view, three forms of positive action ex-
isted. ' The first form removes the "condition of disadvantage" through
"vocational guidance and training. 62 The second form designs actions "to
foster balance between family and career responsibilities and a better distri-
bution" between the sexes.63 The third form focuses on compensation for
past inequality - preferential treatment through quotas and goals.64 Ac-
cording to Mr. Tesauro, quotas fit the third category, but equal opportuni-
ties should put people at equal starting points.65 The equal qualifications of
Ms. Glissman and Mr. Kalanke constitute proof that the two candidates had
equal starting points.66 Thus, the Bremen law merely creates "fair job dis-
tribution," beyond the scope of Article 2(4).67
Ignoring the spirit of the Directive and Recommendation 84/635 which
explains the law,6 the Advocate General argued that the scope of Article
2(4), under which actions discriminatory in appearance are allowed when
intended to eliminate instances of inequality, encompassed only those pro-
grams which create structures for child care and which organize working
hours.69 The Advocate General argued that these measures reduce ine-
qualities.70 While admitting Article 2(4) left Member States the discretion
to determine which social measures to adopt, the Advocate General said
this enabled "Member States to adopt measures designed to eliminate the
unfavorable consequences for women of their biological condition., 71 By
granting such things as maternity leave, one established substantive equal-
ity.72 The Advocate General believed that the derogation in Article 2(4)
stopped short of numerical objectives and positive actions. 73
Ms. Moore, in analyzing the decision of the ECJ, also looked to the
opinion of the Advocate General. 74 Ms. Moore focused on the desire of the
Advocate General to create equal starting points through career training. ,,75
programs, "working hours and child care structures. She claimed this ra-
6 0See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3057, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 181.
61 See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3058-59, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 181-82.
62Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3058, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 181.
63 id.
64See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3058, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 182.
65 See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3059-60, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 182-83.
66See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3060, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 183-84.
67Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3060, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 184.68Article 2 of the Directive and Recommendation 84/635 allow for measures that appear
discriminatory but are created to eradicate discrimination. Council Directive 76/207, supra
note 30, and Council Recommendation 84/635, supra note 3.69Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3061, 1-3063, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 184-85, 186.
70 See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3061, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 184.
71Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3062, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 186.72See id.
73 See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3063, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 186-87.





tionale was consistent with the decision and the Advocate General's ration-
ale in Commission v. France,76 "in which the court confirmed that the scope
of Article 2(4) is limited to those measures which are discriminatory in ap-
pearance only and designed, in practice, to secure substantive equality
through the elimination of obstacles which prevent women from pursuing
the same results as men on equal terms."77 While Commission v. France
discussed the scope of Article 2(4) of Council Directive 76/207, the deci-
sion did not limit the measures to those discriminatory in appearance and
designed to "eliminate obstacles which prevent women from pursuing the
same results as men on equal terms. 78 This is only General Tesauro's in-
terpretation. 79 Rather, the ECJ defined the scope of Article 2(4) as an ex-
ception to equal treatment "specifically and exclusively designed to allow
measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended
to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the
reality of social life."80
In Commission v. France, at issue were collective bargaining agree-
ments which allowed for women "the extension of maternity leave; the
shortening of working hours, for example for women over 59 years of age;
the advancement of the retirement age; the obtaining of leave when a child
is ill" and other such measures.8' The court felt such measures worked
against the equal treatment directive in Article 2(1P that "there shall be no
discrimination whatsoever on the grounds of sex."8 Furthermore, the court
found the measures outside the scope of the exceptions in Article 2(3) and
Article 2(4). Article 2(3) did not pertain because that Article refers to
maternity and pregnancy whereas the collective bargaining agreements
pertained in part to old age and parenting-"categories to which both men
and women may equally belong. 84 Article 2(4) did not pertain because
special rights preserved for women in collective ageements were not aimed
at reducing or elimination actual inequalities.8 While Commission v.
France did discuss the scope of Article 2(4), it did not discuss the scope of
this article as it pertains to job promotions and opportunities. Thus, this
case adds little to the analysis of the courts reasoning in Kalanke.
Scrutinizing the arguments of the Advocate General and the way
Moore depicts the decision in Commission v. France, the arguments for
76 1d. at 159.
77Id. at 157.
78Case 312/86, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 1-6315, 1-6332, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R.
408, 420 (1988).
79See Kalanke AG,. E.C.R. at 1-3061, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 184.
8 France, E.C.R at 1-6336, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 418.
81France, E.C.R at 1-6336, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 418.
82See France, E.C.R at 1-6336, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 418.
83See France, E.C.R at 1-6336, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 418-19.
84See France, E.C.R at 1-6336, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 418.
8 See France, E.C.R at 1-6336, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 418.
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overruling the Bremen law on equal treatment disappear once again. A
strict interpretation of the language of Article 2(4), in combination with the
clarification of Recommendation 84/635/EEC, allows positive action meas-
ures such as the law of Bremen. 86 Article 2(4) allows discriminatory prac-
tices if the practices eliminate obstacles to equality for women.87
Recommendation 84/635/EEC interprets Article 2(4) as the promotion of
positive action for women to counteract the prejudicial effect on women
arising from "social attitudes, behavior and structures. 88 The largest obsta-
cle to the advancement of women, or to any minority advancement, is
prejudice. One way to combat the prejudice against promoting women is to
mandate promotions under circumstances such as those in Kalanke. While
not every society agrees with such measures, Germany was not outside the
scope of European Union law when it decided to promulgate legislation to
promote women. The patriarchal approach of Mr. Tesauro toward these
statutes ignores the real prejudice that exists in the labor market for women.
Notwithstanding these arguments, the opinion of the ECJ, supported by rea-
soning in the opinion of the Advocate General, is the law for the fifteen
states that make up the European Union.
III. THE FAILURE OF IMMEDIATELY SUBSEQUENT RULINGS TO HELP
CLARIFY THE DECISION
Subsequent decisions do little to clarify the position of the ECJ on
positive action. The Court ruled that measures that grant women automatic
or "absolute and unconditional" priority over men or that substitute the end
result of equality for equality of opportunity are against the equal treatment
directive of Article 2(1).89 Yet, the Court gave no direction as to what
measures are acceptable under Article 2(4), and cases decided after Kalanke
lack further instruction. The cases even contradict each other.
During the same week the Kalanke ruling came down, the ECJ struck
down a British government scheme that allowed women over the age of
sixty free prescriptions, by allowing an extension of the free prescriptions to
both sexes.90 Men originally were ineligible for free prescriptions until they
reached the age of sixty-five.91 "The differential saved the government"
$45 million a year.92 The British government believed that since the legal
age in Britain for gaining retirement benefits made a distinction between
men and women, extending the distinction to prescriptions was permissi-
86See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3053-54, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 177-78.87See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3053, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 177.
88See Kalanke AG, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3054, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 177-78.
89Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3078, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 194.
9°See Case C-137/94, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Cyril
Richardson, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3407, 1-3431 and 1-3436, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 376, 393 and 396
(1995).
91Richardson, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3430, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 392.92Barbash, supra note 7, at A25.
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ble.9 3 The ECJ ruled that the program violated European Union sex dis-
crimination laws.94 The court found that the discrimination was not essen-
tial to the financial equilibrium of the social security regime; and,
furthermore, this discrimination "is not objectively necessary to ensure co-
herence between the retirement pension system" and the prescription sys-
tem.
95
The Court further reasoned that "since women can retire after the legal
age of sixty and men before the legal age of sixty-five, without any effect
on the exemption of women over sixty from paying for medicines, there is
no link between the criteria for retirement and those for free medicines.
Consequently, the exemption on retirement age could not be extended to the
provision of free medicines and equipment.,
96
The Court framed the issue as whether a man must retire at sixty-five
and whether a woman must retire at the age of sixty. Since the retirement
ages are not mandatory, the Court posited, the age at which one may start
receiving free medicine should not be fixed. However, because retirement
benefits are only received at these ages, some women workers will take ad-
vantage of retiring at sixty and most men will work until they are sixty-five
so as to not lose pension benefits. Thus, the real issue becomes whether
women who have retired should pay for medicine until age sixty-five or
whether men who have not retired should receive free medicine for five
years. The court could legitimately argue that this policy is discriminatory;
but then the entire retirement benefit plan in England would be discrimina-
tory.
While the Richardson decision is consistent with Kalanke in that sex
discrimination is illegal under automatic conditions, a subsequent decision
by the ECJ results in the opposite conclusion than that in Kalanke, allowing
sex discrimination if the prejudicial treatment serves a public purpose. In
December 1995, not two months after Kalanke, the ECJ ruled that national
provisions may preclude part-time workers in minor employment, meaning
less than 15 hours a week, from statutory old-age insurance if the legislation
achieves a social policy aim separate from discrimination, even if consid-
erably more women are affected.9 7 The plaintiff, a German national,
worked less than fifteen hours a week and earned one-seventh "of the aver-
age monthly salary of persons insured under the statutory old-age insurance
scheme." 98 She worked and paid compulsory insurance until her children
93See Richardson, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3430-31, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 392-93.
94 See Richardson, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3429 and 1-3433, [1995] 3 C.M.LR. at 393-94.
95See Richardson, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3431-32, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 393.
96EU Court Rules Against Discrimination in Favour of Women, EUR. Soc. POL'Y, Nov.
16, 1995, at 57 [hereinafter Against Discrimination]. See also Richardson, 1995 E.C.R. at I-
3432-33, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 393.97Case C-317/93, Nolte v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4625, 1-
4661-62.
98Nolte, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-4653.
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were born, and then she worked part-time in minor employment as a
cleaner.99 In 1988, she became ill and later applied "for retirement and an
invalidity pension;" however, her application was rejected because she had
not paid into the fund for thirty-six months during the last sixty months.)°
The Sozalgericht Hannover, the body to which Mrs. Nolte appealed the
decision, argued that this plan amounted to indirect discrimination against
women, since women compose the majority of part-time workers in minor
employment.'0 1 Germany countered with a statement about the need for
minor employment and its inability to supply the workers for the work force
without denying them compulsory insurance. z02 The ECJ held that "social
policy is a matter for the Member States" and upheld the exclusion of the
plaintiff from the pension.103
Just a few months after Richardson, the ECJ ruled that "[M]ember
[S]tates may not enact legislation which denies compensation for part-time
workers participating in work committees and training programs outside of
normal working hours, where the majority" of the "part-time workers are
women."' 4 In this particular case, a part-time female employee attended a
five-day training course. 05 While all full-time employees in attendance
were paid for a full week, she was only paid for her contractual work week
of four days. 10 6 Meaning, she worked an extra, uncompensated day while
her full-time colleagues worked their regular schedules.'0 7 Unequal treat-
ment, as defined by the ECJ, included paying full-time employees higher
salaries than part-time employees for the same number of hours worked.'0 8
The Court reasoned that where a difference in treatment between full and
part-time workers exists and where a majority of part-time workers are
women, the application of the laws amounted to indirect sex discrimination
in the matter of pay.'0 9 Yet, the ECJ still reaffirmed its commitment to al-
lowing the social policy issues of a Member State to govern if the Member
State's national courts found the policy issues and law to have a purpose
unrelated to the gender discrimination. 1°
The ECJ seemed to have implemented a policy of not allowing any
type of sex discrimination unless promulgated under the guise of a Member
99Nolte, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-4653.
"°°Nolte, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-4653-54.
'0 'Nolte, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-4654 and 1-4658.
102Nolte, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-4659-60.
'03Nolte, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-4660-62.
104 Court Says Part-Timers Must Get Fair Compensation, REUTER EuR. COMMUNITY
REP., Feb. 6, 1996 [hereinafter Part-Timers]. Case C-457/93, Kuratorium fur Dialyse und
Nierentransplantation e. V v. Lewark, 1996 E.C.R. 1-243, 1-271-72.
105Lewark, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-262.
106Lewark, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-263 and 1-272.
1071d.
'01 Lewark, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-267.
'09Lewark, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-271-72.
"0 Lewark, 1996 E.C.R. at 269.
The Kalanke Ruling
18:730 (1998)
State's social policy. The Court left a trail of irreconcilable precedents
based on ideas of gender equality and of social policy concerns being left to
the States. The Court only succeeded in allowing equal or worse treatment
for women in each case, while leaving the scope of Article 2(4) unclear.
The Advocate General tried to clarify his reasoning in the Kalanke
matter in a case regarding gender reassignment. In P. v. S. and Cornwall
County Council, P., a manager at an educational facility then operated by
the Cornwall County Council, requested and appeared to obtain the support
of his supervisor S. before undergoing a gender reassignment operation. m
In the summer of 1992, while P. underwent the first operation, S. and the
board of governors of the educational establishment where P. worked,
chose to dismiss P. in three months, effective December 31, 1992.112 When
P. offered to the fulfill the rest of his duties at work dressed as a woman, the
governors told P. to work from home.1 3 P. underwent the final operation
on December 23, 1992, before the dismissal took effect, and brought suit
the following March.
114
The Industrial Tribunal started and the ECJ was advised to start from
the point that P. was dismissed solely for the sex-change operation.115 The
issue before the court was "can a transsexual, if he or she is dismissed be-
cause he or she is a transsexual, in particular when he or she undergoes
gender reassignment, successfully rely on [Directive 76/207]? ' '16 The ECJ
ruled that the transsexual may rely on the directive, even though there is
nothing specific in European Union law or the national laws to justify such
reliance.1
The Advocate General argued that because "P. would not have been
dismissed" if she "remained a man," the case involved discrimination on
the grounds of sex. 8 The prohibition against discrimination on the
grounds of sex was seen as part of the principle of equality, which man-
dated "no account to be taken of discriminatory factors," such as sex. 1 9
The Advocate General argued that individuals must be treated alike and sex
must not influence the treatment of workers. 120 Mr. Tesauro clarified that
the Kalanke ruling showed that the exceptions only permit those programs
1 Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, Opinion of the Advocate General,
1996 E.C.R. 1-2145, 1-2146, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 247,250 (1996) [hereinafter P. v. S. AG].
12p. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2147, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 250.
"3P. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2147, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 250-51.
114p. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2147, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 251.
1151d.
116p. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2145, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 249.
1
7 Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2159, 1-2165,
[1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 261, 263 (1996) [hereinafter P. v. S.].
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that, because they "aim at attaining substantive equality," ensure actual
equality M rather than merely numerical equality.
Mr. Tesauro then drew an analogy between the inequality suffered by
women and that suffered by transsexuals. 122 He argued that discrimination
against women is not "due to their physical characteristics," but to their role
in society and the images society has of them.123 Just as it would be hard to
argue that P. lost the job because his abilities to perform the job had
changed, job discrimination is not against the physical abilities of
women.124 Rather, according to Mr. Tesauro, society shared a negative im-
age of both women in the workplace and of transsexuals.125 Thus, trans-
sexuals needed a minimum of protection under the sex discrimination
laws.126 Mr. Tesauro's final proposal to the ECJ was that "Articles 2(1) and
5(1) of the Council Directive" should "be interpreted as precluding the dis-
missal of a transsexual on account of a change of sex.' 27
Mr. Tesauro, and ultimately the ECJ, reached the correct conclusion in
P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council. The defendants in that case dis-
missed P. based on sex. Because Council Directive 76/207 outlaws dis-
crimination on the grounds of sex or gender, the directive was held to apply.
Yet, the Advocate General's analogy between this case and the situation of
women within the scope of the Kalanke decision is confusing. The Kalanke
ruling focused on the scope of Article 2(4). Article 2(4) did not apply to the
P. v. S. case. Yet, Mr. Tesauro made an analogy to express his opinion that
the sex of a person should be irrelevant with regard to the rules regulating
job discrimination. He wanted gender never to be a consideration in an
employment decision.
While this premise may be tenable in a gender-neutral world, it does
not work in the real world. If equal treatment laws exist only on the books,
equality in fact cannot be realized. 28 Over the past twenty years in Europe,
the station of women has not improved.129 Since the 1970s, when anti-
discrimination legislation was first enacted, few significant improvements
have transpired for working women. 30 By the 1980s, on average, women
constituted 38.2 % of the labor force of the European Community.' 3' Yet,
121p. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2154, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 257-58.
122p. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2154-55, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 258.
123p. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2155, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 258.
124P. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2154-55, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 258.
125p. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2155, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 258.
126/Id.
127P. v. S. AG, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2158, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 260-61.
128 John Gibeaut, Same Words, Different Meanings: Affirmative Action Debate is Rife
with Views on How to Achieve Equality, 83 A.B.A.J. 106 (Apr. 1997) (addressing racial dis-
crimination).
129 1997 O.J. (C 30) 5; Communication on the Kalanke Ruling, EuR. INDus. REL. REV.,
29, n.269, June 1996.




the difference in wages between men and women decreased slightly more
than three percent between 1975 and 1985, and remained "between 25 and
35 percent in most Member States." 132 While more women entered the
market, they frequently entered "low pay, low status and minimal social
protection" positions. 133 The unemployment rates of women, as compared
to men, were and are higher, with "rates in 1988 at around 13 percent" for
women compared with about eight percent for men.134 This lack of im-
provement lead to the enactment of positive actions laws because European
governments thought that prohibitions against gender discrimination were
not enough to achieve actual equality.13  Yet, the ECJ struck down this
form of improvement.
136
The Kalanke ruling outlawed automatic positive action measures
which substitute the result of equality instead of providing equal opportuni-
ties. Advocate General Tesauro voiced the idea of a society of equal start-
ing points and genderless hiring practices. Subsequent decisions have
failed to explain how Kalanke should be reconciled with other gender-
related problems in the European Union. The instability of the present state
of gender relations and legislation in the EU have some Europeans won-
dering what the long-range effects of the Kalanke decision will be and ask-
ing what steps can be taken to undo the Kalanke ruling.
IV. REACTIONS TO THE KALANKE RULING BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
As if the Kalanke ruling opened the floodgates, the European women's
movement suffered other setbacks as well. The day after the Kalanke rul-
ing, at its annual conference, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the
dominant political party in Germany, opposed proposed measures "to re-
serve one third of all party posts and candidate slots for women.'' 37 The
proposal fell five votes short of passing.
138
Along similar lines, after the Kalanke decision, Tory chairperson of
Great Britain, Brian Mawhinney, declared the ruling the "'final nail in the
coffin' for women-only shortlists" for promotion to election candidates
within the Labour party. 3 9 He felt compelled to eliminate the plan to pro-





135 Comnmunication on the Kalanke Ruling, supra note 129.
136Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3079, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 195.
137 Women's Quota Move by Kohl Fails, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 19, 1995, at 9 [hereinafter
Kohl Fails].
138Id.
139 John Deans, Blow for Labour on Jobs for the Girls, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 18, 1995, at 5
[hereinafter Girls].
140Id. All-women shortlists have not disappeared despite Mawhinney's prediction.
While the lists "were stopped in January, 1996, when an industrial tribunal ruled that they
745
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Reactions to the Kalanke ruling have crossed the spectrum of ideologi-
cal standards. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) said: "Today's
ruling confirms the CBI's view that positive discrimination is unlawful.
The CBI believes there is only one acceptable form of discrimination, and
that is on ability.' 141 One paper claimed that the British government, which
opposes job quotas, displayed "quiet official smiles.' 42
The discrimination laws of the United Kingdom prohibit positive ac-
tion measures. 143 "Preferential treatment of members of one sex (or racial
group) constitutes unlawful direct discrimination contrary to the Sex Dis-
crimination Act 1975" and the "Race Relations Act 1976."14 The provi-
sions in these acts allow special treatment in certain circumstances, but the
treatment is "limited to single-sex training or encouragement to counteract
the effects of past discrimination in particular work where, in the previous
twelve months, there were no persons, or a comparatively small number of
persons, of the sex doing that work."'145 These measures do not extend to
recruitment or promotion.
146
Even some private individuals affected by the decision approved of the
ruling. Helga Kowalski, forty-eight, a worker in the European market, felt
sorry for women who obtained their jobs through quota systems. 147 "I be-
lieve in the principle of the right person for the right job regardless whether
it's a man or a woman.' 4 8 Ms. Kowalski, however, favored measures ad-
dressing child care and the "assistance of husbands at home" that "help
women pursue their careers.' 49
At the other end of the spectrum, women's groups are reeling from the
decision 150 and feel that the ruling was an affront to the advancement of
women.151 "In Germany, politicians reacted angrily," calling for "their
government to raise the issue at next year's intergovernmental confer-
breached the Sex Discrimination Act," half of the women who obtained seats in the House of
Commons during the Labour Party's landslide victory in May 1997, were chosen from such
lists. Kirsty Milne, Labour's Quota Women are on a Mission to Modernise, 126 NEW
STATESMAN 16, n.4334 (May 16, 1997). While a former press secretary, now MP for
Leicester West, Patricia Hewitt, feels the policy of shortlists has been vindicated, others still
search for alternative means of opening the selection process to women. Id.
14lPeter Benesh, European Court Bans Affirmative Action for Gender, PITTSBURGH
POsT-GAzETTE, Oct. 182 1995, at A12.
1421n the Courts (2), ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995, at 53.
1
43 Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, Part 1, §§ 1(1) and 2(1), and Part II, §§ 6(1) and 6(2)
(Eng.) Equal Treatment Directive Outlaws Positive Discrimination, IRS EMPLOYMENT
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14'id.
149Id.
150Kohl Fails, supra note 137.
151 Equal Opportunities, supra note 36.
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ence."' 52 The decision "was denounced as 'cynicism' by high-ranking fe-
male politicians in Germany," and they warned that the movement towards
"equality in the workplace could be slowed as a result" of the decision.153
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the German CDU, disappointed by the
Kalanke decision and the CDU's failure to reserve a third of all party posts
for women, "promised to reintroduce the proposal" regarding party posts at
the meeting again next year.1 54 Rita Suessmuth, head of the women's cau-
cus of the CDU, urged women to continue fighting for better representation
in the party.
55
The Women's Affairs Ministers from eight of the sixteen German
states - "some of which have their own laws giving female public em-
ployees preferential treatment - issued a statement asking the German
government to lobby for a change in European policy.' 5 6 Christine Wis-
cher, Bremen's senator for women, said the ruling calls "into question
German acceptance of European institutions."'
15 7
Some members of the German public felt positive action was justi-
fied.'58 Julius Baer, thirty-one, an unemployed toolmaker felt quotas are
necessary,'5 9 and said: "Attitudes stick too fast and, therefore, some women
do not have a chance despite being well-suited for a job.' 160 Steffi Wel-
scher, a twenty-six year-old nurse, was outraged "that a man went to court
as soon as a woman was given priority.'
161
Elsewhere, "[w]omen's rights advocates condemned the ruling as a
step backward" and said they will "fight to amend the European" treaty.
62
In England, Clare Short, the spokesperson for the Labour Party on
Women's Affairs, countered Brian Mawhinney and said: "The [Kalanke]
ruling does not affect Labour's policy of selecting women candidates in half
our winnable seats. Obviously, party selections are not covered by em-
ployment law.'
63
Pauline Green, leader of the British Socialist Group, said, "the judges
are out of touch with reality for working women in Europe."' 64 Lissy Gro-
152 Robert Rice, Women Job Quotas 'Unlawful': European Court Ruling Raises Doubts
About AffirmativeAction, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1995, at 20.
153 Wosnitza, supra note 7.
1.4 Kohl Fails, supra note 137.
155Id.
1
5 6European Union Court Ruling Limits Job Preference for Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 1995, at All [hereinafter Limits Jobs for Women].
157 Id.; Rice, supra note 152.
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ener, spokesperson for the Social Democratic Women in the European Par-
liament, quipped, "The verdict shows that there is a considerable gap in
equal rights on the European level. I think a tendency is visible here," that,
regarding affirmative action, "the icy wind is again blowing from the
front.
' 16F
Some feel the ruling will have a limited effect.166 An expert for the
European Union did not feel the decision would substantially impact the
Member States because few other governments of the European Union
members "imposed such a strict quota system as the one considered by the
court., 16 7 The expert said "the ruling as worded did not cover voluntary ef-
forts in the private sector.,
168
Similarly, Claudia Nolte, "German [M]inister for [F]amily and
[W]omen's [A]ffairs, cautioned that the ruling only applied to quotas."'
69
She stated that the ruling did not "affect federal legislation that requires
government agencies and state-owned entities to draw up plans to encour-
age employment of women. 170
Yet, others feel that the decision may have a wide-ranging impact.17'
The International Labor Organization (ILO) representatives were split as to
the effects of this ruling on state laws. According to the ILO, "most Euro-
pean Union [S]tates have affirmative action programs.' 72 Italy has over
"50 programs in the corporate sector and the Netherlands [has] several
[programs] in government service. 173 These programs could be affected.
Yet, "the ILO urged governments not to overreact" because the ruling did
not outlaw affirmative action per se - just laws that go too far in setting
numerical, absolute objectives. 174  Barbara Nolan, the spokesperson for
Employment Commissioner Padraig Flynn, agreed the ruling would "have a
significant impact across Europe, particularly in countries like Austria,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands that mandate various
types of positive discrimination."' 75
165Wosnitza, supra note 7.
166See Laura Molinari, The Effect of the Kalanke Decision on the European Union: A
Decision with Teeth, but Little Bite, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 591,591 n.3 (1997).
167Limits Jobs for Women, supra note 156.
1681d.
169Tom Buerkle, Europe's Court Strikes Down Hiring Quotas for Women, INT'L HERALD
TREB., Oct. 18, 1995.
170 Id.
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V. EVALUATION OF SUGGESTIONS OFFERED TO REMEDY THE SITUATION
The question proponents of positive action now face is what can be
done to rectify or minimize the effects of the Kalanke decision. The Com-
mission of the EU suggested amending Article 2(4) to describe the types of
positive action allowed in the aftermath of the decision. 176 Padraig Flynn,
the Social Affairs Commissioner, immediately explained that "he wanted to
find a way to nullify the impact of the recent European Court of Justice
ruling. 1 77 He further stated, "We have to return to the situation that existed
(before) the Court judgment insofar as support for positive action is con-
cerned. 178 The Kalanke opinion raised difficult questions for the Commis-
sion, and Flynn pledged he would be "actively examining" the opinion in
order to discern ways in which the directive could be amended.7
The Commission issued a report to the European Parliament and the
Council regarding the Kalanke ruling on March 27, 1996.80 The report ac-
knowledged the controversy and uncertainty caused by the Kalanke ruling
and stated that it is of "paramount importance together with the fight
against unemployment" to "reaffirm the need to use . . .'positive action'
measures to promote equal opportunities for women and men" by "remov-
ing existing factors of inequality that affect women's opportunities" in em-
ployment.
The Commission then recognized three types of positive action.
1 82
First, positive action involves intervening to remedy disadvantageous situa-
tions "at the level of professional orientation and vocational training.
1 83
The second type focuses on attaining "balance between family and work re-
sponsibilities and more efficient distribution" between the two sexes -
giving priority to "measures concerning the organization of working time,
the development of child-care infrastructure and the reintegration of work-
ers in the labor market after a career break."18 4 The third form aims "to
make up for past discrimination" when "preferential treatment is prescribed
in favor of certain categories of persons" and "may take the form of quota
systems or targets."'8 5 Then the Commission drew a distinction between
17 6 See Communication on the Kalanke Ruling, supra note 129, at 32.
177 Flynn Wants to Nullify Court Decision on Women, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP.,
Oct. 31, 1995 [hereinafter Flynn to Nullify].178 id"
179Patrick Smyth, EU Court Rules Out Positive Action for Women in Jobs, IRIsH TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1995, at 3.
101997 O.J. (C 30) 5 Communication on the Kalanke Ruling, supra note 129.
'1lid.
182The three types of positive action recognized by the Commission are the same three
forms of positive action articulated by the Advocate General. See supra notes 60-67 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the three forms.
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rigid quotas - where only numbers are considered, and flexible quotas -
where preferential treatment is granted only once qualifications are deemed
equal and individual circumstances are considered.18 6 Thus, the Commis-
sion posed two questions: "Is this a provision limited to safeguarding posi-
tive actions in favor of women at work only as regard measures such as
special assistance for vocations training, leave for family reasons, etc., or
does it also allow positive discrimination in the field of recruit-
ment/promotion by giving preference to women under certain condi-
tions? '18 7 And, "should a distinction be made between positive actions
which take account of considerations of necessity/proportionality and those
which do not?"
'1 8
After quoting some international human rights law that support posi-
tive action measures to obtain equality, the Commission concluded that the
ECJ "only condemned the automatic quota system of the Land of Bre-
men. '18 9 The Commission "therefore takes the view that quota systems
which fall short of the degree of rigidity and automaticity provided for by
the Bremen law have not been touched by the Court's judgment and are, in
consequence, to be regarded as lawful."'1 90
Finally, the Commission suggested that Article 2(4) be amended to
"specifically permit the kinds of positive action which remain untouched by
Kalanke."191 The following language was proposed, with an entirely new
second sentence:
This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal oppor-
tunity for men and women in particular by removing existing inequalities
which affect the opportunities of the under-represented sex in the areas referred
to in Article 1, section 1. Possible measures shall include the giving of prefer-
ence, as regard access to employment or promotion, to a member of the under-
represented sex, provided that such measures do not preclude the assessment of
the particular circumstances of an individual case.
192
The Commission clarified that such an amendment "would make it
clear that positive action measures short of rigid quotas are permitted by
Community law" and reflects the "legal position which results from the
judgment of the Court.,
193
Not everyone shared the Commission's view of the proposed amend-
ment to Article 2(4). The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confedera-









ruling. 194 UNICE saw the ruling as limiting positive action to providing
"better opportunities for women" and saw the proposed amendment as cre-
ating more questions instead of clarifying the ruling.'95 The UNICE viewed
the decision of the court as being straightforward - it prohibited the auto-
matic promotion of women and thought that the proposed amendment
would leave the terms for employers ambiguous, allowing positive action if
individual circumstances were assessed. UNICE proposed that flexible
quotas be replaced with "more precise 'numerical objectives' if such an
amendment was implemented.
The amendment proposed by the Commission could be difficult to en-
act because of the need for the Member States' unanimous support.19 7 The
amended proposal also omits the requirement that the candidates have
"equal qualifications," because this would cause some Member States "to
backtrack on their own programs."' 98 "Karen Banks, an aide to European
Social Affairs Commissioner Padraig Flynn, said she was optimistic the EU
states, including Britain," would endorse the proposal since the text did not
require members to do anything, but allowed them to act if they so
choose.' 99 The EU would not impose positive action on Member States. °0
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health also did not share the Com-
mission's view on amending Article 2(4). The Ministry published a bro-
chure entitled "Act on Equality Between Women and Men" which proposed
a different approach.20 1 The Act:
* prevents direct and indirect discrimination based on gender;
* improves the status of women particularly in working life;
* gives those discriminated [against] in working life a right to claim compen-
sation;
* obliges the authorities to change such circumstances that prevent the
achievement of equality;
* requires that men and women shall be provided equal opportunities for edu-
cational and occupational advancement;
* demands [a]n even distribution of male and female members in state and
municipal bodies.
202
The Act prohibits an employer from terminating a pregnant employee,203
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hibits sex discrimination including the attempt to "recruit an applicant who
is not as qualified as another rival candidate of the opposite sex.",
204
The Ministry's proposal faces the same obstacles as the Commission's
proposed amendment. The EU Member States must unanimously approve
the Act.2 °5 In addition, the Ministry's proposed Act requires "equal qualifi-
cations," a standard some member States' laws do not meet.206
Yet, amendments to the EC Treaty occurred in the aftermath of the
Kalanke decision. These amendments attempt to clarify the Community
position on gender discrimination. An addition to Article 3 of the Treaty,
known as the Treaty of Amsterdam, reads: the "Community shall aim to
eliminate inequalities and to promote equality between men and women. 2 °7
The new wording of Article 119.4 now reads:
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in
working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any member
state from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages
in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational
activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional ca-
reers.
208
The author of an article regarding these amendments, Celia Hampton,
contends that these two additions allow for preferences in favor of equally
qualified women when women are under-represented in a position.20 9 Yet,
the author also realizes that these measures "do not affect the underlying
ruling", in Kalanke.210 The amendments made to the Treaty, while suggest-
ing the European Union recognizes and supports the elimination of gender
discrimination, do not clarify the types of positive action Member States
may pursue. The amendment to Article 119.4 merely allows for vocational
classes and compensation, not promotions.
The German state of North Rhine-Westphalia dealt with the Kalanke
ruling by distinguishing the North Rhine-Westphalian law from the law of
Bremen.211 The positive action law in North Rhine-Westphalia remained in
effect despite the Kalanke ruling against it.212 On December 19, 1995, "a
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209 Celia Hampton, Equal Treatment and Employment, Bus. L. EuR., July 1, 1997.
21Old"
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had been passed over for a promotion" for a male colleague.21 3 The Ad-
ministrative Court invoked Kalanke; however, Minister of Women, Ilse
Ridder-Melcher, announced that the affirmative action law will stay in ef-
fect because the Administrative Court had no jurisdiction over laws "passed
by the state parliament. 21 4 Only the Federal Constitutional Court had such
authority.21 5 Ms. Ridder-Melcher further distinguished the law of North
Rhine-Westphalia from that of Bremen because of the provision in the for-
mer, mandating each case "to be reviewed individually to assure that the
man" under review, is "not put under 'unfair hardship"' by not receiving the
216promotion.
The ECJ agreed with Ms. Ridder-Melcher's characterization of the
North Rhine-Westphalian law. In the case of Marschall v. Land of Nor-
drhein-Westfalen, the Court revisited the issue of positive action in Ger-
many.21 7  The case began when a German school teacher, Helmutt
Marschall, applied for a promotion and was allegedly told by the school
board that they "intended to appoint a female candidate. ' '218 The German
court stayed the proceedings and referred a question to the ECJ regarding
the validity of the statute under EU law.219
In his recommendation to the Court, Advocate General Jacobs, like
former Advocate General Tesauro, distinguished between the result of
equality and actual equal opportunities.220 Jacobs stated that "there is no
equal opportunity for men and women in an individual case if, where all
else is equal, one is appointed or promoted in preference to the other solely
by virtue of his or her sex. 221
The ECJ, however, once again focused on whether the preference was
absolute, upholding the law because it allows for an objective assessment in
favor of men competing with women for positions.222 The law reads that
where "there are fewer women than men in the particular higher grade post
in the career bracket, women are to be given priority for promotion in the
event of equal suitability, competence and professional performance, unless
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vor."223 The Court found that this "savings clause ' 224 distinguished this
statute from the Bremen law.225
Other German states followed suit and prevented the destruction of
their positive action laws by adopting flexible quota systems.226 The high-
est labor court in Germany, however, outlawed the law of Bremen because
it violated European Union law.227 In light of the Kalanke ruling, the deci-
sion to hire Mr. Kalanke would have to be reviewed, but he would not
automatically get the job.228 Due to the flexible nature of quota systems in
other German states, Kalanke is the only hiring decision up for review.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
In proposing the amendment to Article 2(4) of Council Directive
76/207, the Commission had the correct idea, but the idea stopped short of
any substantive changes to rectify the Kalanke decision.229 Similarly, the
Ministry came close to changing the result of Kalanke, but went too far in
requiring equal qualifications. Only one thing need be done to counteract
the effects of Kalanke. While the EC treaty leaves room for positive action
measures to be adopted, the right to positive action must be written into the
Directive in order to counteract Kalanke.
Mr. Tesauro was correct in arguing that women deserve equal starting
points.230 While countries should continue to provide equal training and
education to women, this is not enough. Prejudice exists in societies to
such an extent that equal qualifications will not necessarily result in the
promotion of women.231 Societal attitudes keep women from attaining the
same goals as their male colleagues, as evidenced by relevant statistics.
2
The problem with Kalanke is that it creates rather than remedies dis-
crimination. According to statistics, "woman-friendly legislation and af-
firmative action programs in the past decades" have not resulted "in a
2 2 Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6386, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 566.
224The savings clause is the portion of the law that states, "unless reasons specific to an
individual candidate tilt the balance in his favour."
'2 5Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6391-92, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 569-71.226Bremen's Affirmative Action Program Violates EU Law, Court Says, WK. IN
GERMANY, Mar. 15, 1996 [hereinafter Bremen's Law].
227id.
228id.
229The Social Affairs Ministers of the Council rejected the Commission's amendment to
Directive 76/207 on April 17, 1997. The Council felt the Commission's proposal anticipated
subsequent ECJ decisions and thus was premature. Positive Discrimination, Bus. L. EuR.,
Apr. 30, 1997.
23°See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 128-35 (showing equal treatment laws do not sub-
stantially improve the situation of women in the European labor market). See also infra text
accompanying notes 233-36 (discussing women in the European labor market).232See infra text accompanying notes 233-36.
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gender balance on the European job market., 233 "Although receiving the
same training, women still earn 25 percent less and their unemployment
rate exceeds that of men by about three percent. ' 234 "While making up 51.2
percent of the European population," females "form a 27.6 [percent] minor-
ity" in the Parliament.235 Before the Scandinavian countries entered the EU
in January 1995, "Britain was the only country" where the "unemployment
rate [for women] fell below that of men" - mainly because of "wide-
spread part-time employment.
236
By allowing employers to make employment decisions on a case-by-
case basis, the ECJ is returning employment practices to their pre-1975
status. A case can be made for any employee that denial of a promotion
caused "unfair hardship.2 37 Effectively, European employers would never
have to promote women into higher earning brackets and positions of
power. The employer could always argue that a man needed the money to
support his family, children, or aging parents. This decision perpetuates the
system that was already in place. It is "a step backward," 23 to quote Euro-
pean women's groups.
The European Commission proposed adding a sentence to Article 2(4)
explaining the right to give preference to the under-represented sex as long
as an assessment of the circumstances of the case are taken into account.
This proposed amendment, which asks for preference after an assessment of
each individual case, does nothing but reconfirm Kalanke. The Commis-
sion argued that it is trying to limit the interpretation of Kalanke. Yet, Ka-
lanke is ambiguous and allows employers to refuse promotions to women.
The Kalanke ruling is what is damaging, and the amendment merely codi-
fies it.
The Council of Ministers agreed with this observation. The Social Af-
fairs Council decided to "hold off on amending" Article 2(4).240 In consid-
ering the amendment, the Ministers argued that the "legislation was
unnecessary since the court ruling spoke for itself .... 2 The Council
waited for another ECJ ruling to clarify Kalanke242 and "for the outcome of
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discussions" on these issues "at the inter-governmental conference on EU
treaty reforms."
243
The Commission should instead amend the Directive to undo the rul-
ing. The Commission should start with Article 2(1) and add a sentence ex-
plaining that Article 2(4) is exempted from this provision. Then Article
2(4) should be supplemented with a provision, so that it reads:
This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal
opportunity for men and women in particular by removing existing inequalities
which affect the opportunities of the under-represented sex in the areas referred
to in Article 1, section 1. Existing inequalities include prejudice towards hiring
and promoting members of the under-represented sex. Member States may
create measures to combat this prejudice by giving priority to persons of the
under-represented sex. Priority does not mean absolute promotion within the
confines of this Article. Preference may be given to such candidates if the
Member State so decides. However, Member States may interpret priority as
absolute promotion unless the promotion would cause 'undue hardship' on the
other candidates. The burden of proving undue hardship employs a higher
standard than proving the financial loss resulting from not obtaining the pro-
motion.
The first 'sentence of this proposal contains the actual language of Arti-
cle 2(4). The second sentence defines the scope of the provision. The third
sentence grants Member States that wish to enact positive action laws the
legal authority to do so. The fourth sentence is crucial in that it explains
that priority is not a strict quota system. Thus, the fourth sentence allows
for laws such as the one challenged in Kalanke. The fifth sentence reiter-
ates that priority is merely a preference system. The sixth sentence protects
the over-represented gender class in cases where the promotion of the un-
der-represented candidate would be unfair to the over-represented candi-
date. Yet, sentence seven limits that protection by creating a higher
standard of proof than the financial loss from not being promoted.
Many groups expressed doubt about the possibility that such a provi-
sion would be passed by the Parliament, especially given the requirement of
unanimous support for an amendment to the Directive.244 This doubt lacks
foundation. Many Member States, including Great Britain, were members
of the EC when these measures were adopted.245 Once these recommenda-
tions passed, no members withdrew because of them.
The only perceived aggressive, dissenter to positive action is Great
Britain.246 Yet, Great Britain is unlikely to withdraw from the Community
over such an issue. The economic benefits it gains from the European Un-
ion far outweigh the effect of any such provision. Would Great Britain
really sacrifice a free trade zone over such a law? Furthermore, the provi-
243Id.
244See Perry, supra note 197, at 38.
245See supra text within note 7, paragraph 1, regarding when Member States joined the
Community.246See supra text accompanying notes 197-200, at 38.
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sions are not mandatory and would not necessarily affect Great Britain -
their meritocracy would be just as legitimate as Germany's 'positive action'
programs. A good advocate could win this point on the public forum floor.
In Europe, the dynamics of the labor market create a stage for writing
positive action into EU law. Laws for positive action already exist in many
of the Member States. Increased political pressure on government repre-
sentatives, such as was exhibited in Germany,2 47 will force the representa-
tives to act.
The Commission even has its own policy on the issue. The Commis-
sion identified "the need to take an active part in promoting awareness of
equal opportunities and changing attitudes within the EU on the roles and
abilities of men and women., 248 Since 1982, the Commission has imple-
mented three programs with various aims toward equality.249 The 1991-95
action program aimed "to improve the position of women in the labour
market and the status of women in society, with particular emphasis on their
access to the decision-making process. '250  The Commission has exten-
sively researched gender inequality and supported conferences, workshops,
and training projects on the subject.251 Yet, the Kalanke ruling effectively
made the Commission's program "for promoting women among its 19,000
[member] staff" illegal.25
With the amount of support for positive action on a public policy level,
it is not in the best interest of any Member State to stand in the way of such
an amendment to the Directive. Previous legislation regarding equality for
women has been passed, and analogous laws currently exist in a number of
Member States. There is no valid reason why such an amendment would
not succeed. The European Commission must work toward the goal of
writing positive action into the Directive in order to deflate the effects of
Kalanke.
247 See supra text accompanying note 155, at 30.
248 Commission Overview of EU Action on Equal Opportunities, Commission Press Re-
lease Memo 95/27: Equal Opportunities Between Women and Men, REUTER EUR.
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